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THE QUEST FOR COHERENCE IN JUDICIAL REASONING. 
TWO APPROACHES FOR REPRESENTING CASES IN 
CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION FRAMEWORK 
 
Michał Araszkiewicz and Jaromír Šavelka∗ 
 
 
Abstract. There are two fundamentally distinct approaches towards 
modeling of legal reasoning – the top-down and bottom-up approaches. The 
main difference lies in the method of acquiring the elements which consequently 
constitute the model. This paper aims to compare the approaches as regards the 
resulting model represented in the coherence as constraint satisfaction network. 
At first the top-down approach is applied to the Court of Justice European Union 
case of Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany v. 
Ministerstvo kultury ČR and the resulting model is presented and briefly 
assessed. The very same case is then modeled using the bottom-up approach. 
While both models that have been created differ quite significantly they display 
surprisingly similar features. Both models suggest that the court provides the 
interpretation of key terms without grounding it in the provisions of authoritative 
texts. Thus, it either seems to be the case that there is a large portion of implicit 
reasoning both models fail to express or that the reasoning of the court is 
actually not grounded in authoritative text. 
 
Key-words. Coherence, constraint satisfaction, top-down, bottom-up, legal 
reasoning. 
 
1. Introduction 
The present paper is an extension of our previous work presented in 
Araszkiewicz and Šavelka1, in which we focused on the problem of the 
tension between the application of top-down and bottom-up strategy in 
representation of legal reasoning. The juxtaposition of these two 
                                           
∗ Michał Araszkiewicz, Department of Legal Theory, Faculty of Law and 
Administration, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland. 
Jaromír Šavelka, Institute of Law and Technology, Faculty of Law, Masaryk 
University, Brno, Czech Republic. 
1 The research abstract has been published as M. ARASZKIEWICZ, J. ŠAVELKA 
(2011), Two Methods for Representing Judicial Reasoning in the Framework of 
Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction, in: Legal Knowledge and Information 
Systems. JURIX: the Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference, ATKINSON K. (ed. by), 
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Vol. 235, IOS Press, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands, pp. 165-166. 
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approaches is by no means a new phenomenon in research on AI. 
Traditionally, the former technique insists on the use of algorithms and 
formal logical frameworks, while the latter – on employment of such 
tools as neural networks and evolutionary computation. As regards the 
first approach, the structure is given at the outset and the data is 
ordered according to this structure. In the second case, the order should 
emerge from the initial set of data. 
We attempt to represent judicial reasoning in a chosen case by 
means of constraint satisfaction networks. The choice of this general 
framework for our presentation is motivated, first, by the conviction that 
coherence is the key factor as regards justification of legal reasoning, 
and second, by the assumption that Thagard’s conception of coherence 
as constraint satisfaction2 is a plausible and inspiring proposal. We 
attempt to show that this general framework allows for application of 
both top-down and bottom-up strategies for representing judicial 
reasoning. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss 
briefly the methods for representation of reasoning in AI and Law 
research and we outline Thagard’s conception of coherence as constraint 
satisfaction and characterize it from the point of view of the 
abovementioned distinction. Second, we present the case to be 
represented and motivate our choice. In the third part the case is 
represented by means of Coherence Model of Legal Argumentation 
(CMLA), that is, the top-down constraint satisfaction technique. Fourth, 
we represent the case in a constraint network constructed along with 
bottom-up strategy. In the last part we compare the results and present 
conclusions stemming from the analysis. 
 
2. The Top-Down vs. Bottom Up Method in AI and Law. 
Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction 
Although the distinction between top-down and bottom-up approach 
is present in the research on AI and Law, it is obvious from the literature 
that the former dominates the latter. Some plausible causes of such 
situation are the following: (1) important tradition of formal-logical 
approach to the representation of legal reasoning3; (2) the emphasis on 
general and universal features in legal reasoning as presented in 
                                           
2 The detailed exposition can be found in P. THAGARD, Coherence in Thought 
and Action, MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 2000. 
3 Cf. C. ALCHOURRÓN, E. BULYGIN, Normative Systems, Springer, Wien, New 
York, 1972; U. KLUG, Juristiche Logik, Berlin-Göttingen-Heidelberg, 1958. 
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classical theories of legal argumentation4; (3) the necessity to account 
for logical structure of the law in order to represent it in programming 
languages5; (4) the emergence of rich systems of non-classical logic 
designed to account for important peculiarities of legal reasoning6; and 
(5) the emergence of abstract argumentation frameworks7 and their 
application to legal reasoning8. The choice of the top-down method, very 
natural in the context of Rule Based Reasoning (RBR), is also very 
common in the field of Case Based Reasoning (CBR) (to mention 
abstract concepts of factors and/or dimensions9) and in the theory 
construction approach (abstract concepts of elements of the case base 
and of the theory constructors)10. The use of the tools  typically 
employed in the “engineering” sub-branch of the general AI research, 
like neural networks, is not very common in the field of AI and Law11 
and it is often criticized and skeptically looked at12.  
                                           
4 Cf. R. ALEXY, A Theory of Legal Argumentation. The Theory of Rational 
Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification, (trans. R. ADLER, N. MACCORMICK), 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, /1st German ed. 1978/, 1989; A. PECZENIK, On Law and 
Reason, 2nd ed., Springer, (1st ed. 1989), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 2008. 
5 Cf. M. SERGOT, F.  SADRI, R. KOWALSKI, F. KRIWACZEK, P. HAMMOND, H.T. CORY, 
1986. The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program, Communications ACM 29, 
1986, pp. 370-386. 
6 Cf. J.C. HAGE, Reasoning with Rules, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1997; H. PRAKKEN, Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument. Study 
of Defeasible Reasoning in Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1997. 
7 Cf. P. DUNG, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in 
nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games, in:  Artificial 
Intelligence, 77, 1995, pp. 321-357. 
8 Cf. H. PRAKKEN, G. SARTOR, A Dialectical Model of Assessing Conflicting 
Arguments in Legal Reasoning, in: Artificial Intelligence and Law 4, 1996, pp. 
331-368. 
9 Cf. V. ALEVEN, Teaching Case-Based Argumentation Through a Model and 
Examples. PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh Graduate Program in Intelligent 
Systems, 1997; K. D. ASHLEY, Modelling Legal Argument. Reasoning with Cases 
and Hypotheticals. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1990. 
10 Cf. T. BENCH-CAPON, G. SARTOR, A model of legal reasoning with cases 
incorporating theories and values, in: Artificial Intelligence 150, 2003, pp. 97-
143. 
11 But cf. J. ZELEZNIKOW, A. STRANIERI, The split-up system: Integrating neural 
networks and rule based reasoning in legal domain, in: Proceedings of the Fifth 
The Quest for Coherence in Judicial Reasoning.  
Two Approaches for Representing Cases in Constraint Satisfaction Framework 
 
i-lex, Novembre 2012, numero 17 176 
In last few decades the view that (the degree of) justification of legal 
reasoning stems from the degree of its coherence gained much attention 
in the field of legal theory13 and simultaneously, a precise account of the 
concept of coherence as constraint satisfaction has been developed by a 
cognitive scientist and philosopher Paul Thagard14. This conception has 
been referred to in AI and Law research, too15. The question is whether 
it is more suitable to represent legal reasoning according to top-down or 
bottom-up method. 
The basic features of the theory of coherence as constraint 
satisfaction are as follows16. A coherence problem is a process of finding 
the most acceptable subset among the initial set of incompatible 
elements, according to the procedure: let E be a finite set of elements 
(e1,….en). The (in)coherence relations between pairs of elements are 
referred to as positive constraints (C+) and negative constraints (C-). 
We need to divide the set E into two disjoint subsets, a subset of 
                                                                                                           
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL 1995, ACM, 
New York, pp. 185-194. 
12 Cf. D. HUNTER, Out of their minds: Legal theories in neural networks, in: 
Artificial Intelligence and Law 7, 1999, pp. 129–151. 
13 Cf. AMAYA, Legal Justification by Optimal Coherence, in: Ratio Juris 24, 
2011, pp. 304-329; J.C. HAGE, Studies in Legal Logic, Springer, Berlin, 2005; A. 
PECZENIK, A Coherence Theory of Juristic Knowledge, in: A.  AARNIO, R. ALEXY, A. 
PECZENIK, W. RABINOWICZ, J. WOLEŃSKI, 1998, On Coherence Theory of Law, 
Juristförlaget i Lund, 1998; A. PECZENIK, On Law and Reason, 2nd ed., Springer, 
(1st ed. 1989, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London), 2008. 
14 Especially in P. THAGARD, Coherence in Thought and Action, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, London, 2000. 
15 Cf. AMAYA, Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology, in: Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 15, 2007, pp. 429-447; AMAYA, Inference to the Best Legal 
Explanation, in: H. KAPTEIN, H. PRAKKEN, B. VERHEIJ (eds.), Legal Evidence and 
Proof. Statistics, Stories, Logic, Ashgate, Surrey, 2009, pp. 135 – 160; T. BENCH-
CAPON, G. SARTOR, A Quantitative Approach to Theory Coherence, in: B. VERHEIJ, 
A. LODDER, R. LOUI, A. MUNTJEWERFF (eds.), Legal Knowledge and Information 
Systems. JURIX 2001: The Fourteenth Annual Conference, IOS Press, 
Amsterdam, 2001, pp. 53-62; S. JOSEPH, H. PRAKKEN, Coherence-Driven 
Argumentation to Norm Consensus, in: The 12th International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law, Proceedings of the Conference (ICAIL-2009), 
ACM, New York, pp. 58-67. 
16 For more detailed exposition please refer to P. THAGARD, Coherence in 
Thought and Action, MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 2000. 
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accepted elements (A) and a subset of rejected elements (R) so that the 
following two conditions are maximized: 
If  <ei, ej> ∊ C+ then ei ∊ A if and only if ej ∊ A. 
If  <ei, ej> ∊ C- then ei ∊ A if and only if ej ∊ R. 
Each constraint is assigned with a number w – the weight of this 
constraint. The sum of weights of all satisfied constraints is symbolized 
by W and is equivalent to the degree of coherence of the result set. Our 
task is to find the W-maximizing division. 
Thagard himself seems to join both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches when applying his theory to the problems of explanation, 
analogy or ethics, but he seems to be more sympathetic towards top-
down method when he tries to define different types of constraints and 
to present a kind of “principle lists” related to (in)coherence relations in 
these different  fields17. Also as regards application of his theory to legal 
reasoning, top-down approach seems to be favored so far18. In this 
paper we show that the application method to the representation of a 
legal case is also possible within this framework and we compare its 
results with the top-down perspective. 
 
3. The case of 22 Dec 2010, C-393/09 – the Graphic User 
Interface (GUI) case 
The grounds from which the reference for a preliminary ruling lodged 
on 5th October 200919 stemmed had been a rather unusual claim20 for 
an appointment of a collective manager of certain economic rights to 
computer programs filed at the Czech Ministry of Culture. During a very 
long procedure in which the claim has got in front of the Czech courts a 
couple of very serious doubts regarding interpretation of EU law 
appeared. These were expressed by the Czech Supreme Administrative 
                                           
17 See Ibid., p. 24. 
18 Cf. AMAYA, Inference to the Best Legal Explanation, in: H. KAPTEIN, H. 
PRAKKEN, B. VERHEIJ (eds.), Legal Evidence and Proof. Statistics, Stories, Logic, 
Ashgate, Surrey 2009, pp. 135-160; M. ARASZKIEWICZ, Balancing of Legal 
Principles and Constraint Satisfaction, in: R.G.F. WINKELS (ed.), Legal Knowledge 
and Information Systems; JURIX 2010: The Twenty-Third Annual Conference 
(2010), pp. 7-16. 
19 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud 
(Supreme Administrative Court) (Czech Republic) lodged on 5 October 2009 - 
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace (Security software association) v Ministerstvo 
kultury ČR (Ministry of Culture of the Czech Republic). 
20 Filed by Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany in 
2001. 
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Court in the reference for the preliminary ruling in the following way: 
“Should Article 1(2) of Council Directive 91/250/EEC21 of 14 May 1991 
on the legal protection of computer programs be interpreted as meaning 
that, for the purposes of the copyright protection of a computer program 
as a work under that directive, the phrase 'the expression in any form of 
a computer program' also includes the graphic user interface of the 
computer program or part thereof?” and “If the answer to the first 
question is in the affirmative, does television broadcasting, whereby the 
public is enabled to have sensory perception of the graphic user 
interface of a computer program or part thereof, albeit without the 
possibility of actively exercising control over that program, constitute 
making a work or part thereof available to the public within the meaning 
of Article 3(1) of European Parliament and Council Directive 
2001/29/EC22 of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects 
of copyright and related rights in the information society?” 
In accordance with the Opinion of Advocate General23 CJEU ruled that 
graphic user interface was not within the scope of the phrase 'the 
expression in any form of a computer program'. The sole reason for 
such a ruling was constituted by the fact that, unlike source code or 
object code, graphic user interface could not on its own lead to a 
creation of an identical copy of a computer program. However, CJEU 
added that graphic user interface was eligible for a general copyright 
protection as any other scientific work or work of art. In such a case it 
was also necessary to provide an answer to the second question even if 
the answer to the first one was not affirmative. Despite being protected 
by copyright CJEU ruled that television broadcasting of graphic user 
interface of a computer program did not constitute making a work 
available, for the essential property of graphic user interface – its role to 
facilitate communication between a user and a computer - was not 
made available by television broadcasting24. 
                                           
21 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of 
computer programs. 
22 Corrigendum to Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society. 
23 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 14th October 2010 in Case 
C-393/09. 
24 See generally: J. ŠAVELKA, Exploring the Boundaries of Copyright Protection 
for Software: An Analysis of the CJEU-Case C-393/09 on the Copyrightability of 
the Graphic User Interface, in: Medien und Recht – International Edition 1, 
2011, pp. 11-16. 
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4. Representation of the Case According to Top-Down 
Technique 
The following representation of the case discussed in the previous 
Section is within the (revised) framework of CMLA.25 As far as this is a 
top-down approach towards representing legal reasoning we first have 
to focus upon two issues: (1) admissible types of elements which can be 
found in the set E and (2) admissible types of constraints between these 
elements. However, as far as we are within the framework of constraint 
satisfaction theory of coherence and not within an axiomatic system of 
logic or abstract argumentation framework, (although the following is to 
large extent inspired by these approaches), we do not have to discuss 
extensively syntactic and semantic aspects of the structures discussed 
below. 
The list of types of elements is determined by general structure of 
judicial reasoning. In consequence, the first necessary type of elements 
are Legal Conclusions. 
Def. 1. Legal Conclusion. Legal conclusion LC is an atomic 
proposition ψ, providing an answer to the posited legal question.  
 In each CMLA constraint network there are exactly two LCs which are 
their mutual negations. In each division of the initial set of elements E 
one of the LCs must be in set subset of Accepted elements and its 
negation in the subset of Rejected Elements. 
The next types of elements represent legal norms. In this respect 
CMLA is based upon the famous distinction between legal rules and legal 
principles.26 In the proposal below we do not focus on the issue of 
application of principles because it is not relevant for the representation 
of the chosen case. 
Def. 2. Rule. Rule R is a conditional proposition of the following 
form:  φ1, φ2,…φn ⟹ ω1, ω2, … ωn, where φ1, φ2,…φn is the antecedent 
of R, φ1, φ2,…φn is the consequent of R, and ⟹ denotes defeasible 
implication. 
The fact that the conditional character of rules should be understood 
as defeasible implication and not strict implication stems from the fact 
that it is the computation of coherence which is ultimately responsible 
for accepting a rule’s consequent. So it is possible that a given 
                                           
25 See the general outline in: M. ARASZKIEWICZ, Balancing of Legal Principles 
and Constraint Satisfaction, in: R.G.F. WINKELS (ed. by), Legal Knowledge and 
Information Systems; JURIX 2010: The Twenty-Third Annual Conference, 2010, 
pp. 7-16. 
26 The role of legal principles and balancing of values was discussed in Ibid. 
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consequent will not be accepted even if it is undoubtedly supported by a 
rule by means of a Modus Ponens – like relation which will be discussed 
below. 
Some of the rules play a special role in legal reasoning and they can 
be referred to as Legal Grounds for a conclusion.   
Def. 3. Legal Ground. A rule R is a Legal Ground (LG) if an only if it 
has a LC as its consequent. 
LGs are privileged rules in the sense that at least one LG should be in 
the subset of Accepted elements in any acceptable division. 
Def. 4. Basic Rule Based Constraint. Basic Rule-Based Constraint 
BRBC has the following form: BRBCx <LG,  LC >, where x: <+, 0, ->. 
BRBCs represent the subsumption relation, which holds when the facts 
of the case can be classified as instantiations of predicates specified in 
the antecedent of the LG involved here.  In such cases the chosen LC is 
supported by LG and the constraint is positive (+). If we are sure that 
the subsumption relation does not hold, then the constraint is negative 
(-). In the case of doubts the relation is neutral (0).   
Of course, not all rules applied by the courts while deciding cases 
specify LCs as their consequents and the different rules may interact in 
constraint networks. This intuition is captured by the distinction between 
cumulation of arguments and chaining of arguments. Let us present 
schemes of these two distinct structures: 
[Cumulation] “x because of (a, b and c)”. 
[Chaining] “x because of a, a because of b and b because of c”.27 
In the framework of CMLA , cumulation of arguments is represented 
simply by the number of positive constraints by which a given LC is 
related to its supporting elements. However, chaining of arguments 
cannot be represented in this way. In order to account for this 
phenomenon, let us introduce a new type of RBC constraint, here 
referred to as Chaining Rule-Based Constraint. 
Def. 5. Chaining Rule-Based Constraint. Chaining Rule-Based 
Constraint (CRBC) has the following form CRBC+ <Ri, Rj>, where the 
consequent of Ri is identical to the antecedent of Rj. This kind of 
constraint is always  positive because it establishes the relation between 
legal predicates and this relation is independent of the facts of the case 
in question. However, whether the facts in question can be subsumed 
under the antecedent of Ri in CRBC bears on the quality of the 
                                           
27 See A. PECZENIK, A Coherence Theory of Juristic Knowledge, in: A.  AARNIO, 
R. ALEXY, A. PECZENIK, W. RABINOWICZ, J. WOLEŃSKI, On Coherence Theory of Law, 
Juristförlaget i Lund, 1998. 
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constraint between Rj and another element (for instance, LC). Let us 
note the following facts concerning this issue: 
Fact 1. If there is a constraint CRBC+ <Ri, LGj> and the facts of the 
case can be subsumed under the antecedent of Ri then there is also a 
constraint BRBC+ <LGj, LC>, where LC is the consequent of LGj and a 
constraint BRBC- <LG i, LC'>. 
Fact 2. If there is a constraint CRBC+<Ri, LGj> and the facts of the 
case cannot be subsumed under the antecedent of Ri then there is also 
a constraint BRBC- <LGj, LC>, where LC is the consequent of LGj and a 
constraint BRBC+ <LG i, LC'>. 
Let us now apply the framework presented here to the GUI case. The 
procedure of framework application consists itself of three steps: (1) 
identification of instantiations of element types in the text of judicial 
decision; (2) identification of instantiations of constraint types in this 
text; (3) computation of coherence. 
For the sake of brevity of the presentation let us concentrate on the 
first question issued by the Czech Supreme Administrative Court. This 
question was asked in order to decide whether graphical user interface 
can be protected by a copyright. Therefore we obtain two mutually 
inconsistent LCs: 
LC: [protected] (graphic user interface), and 
LC': [not protected] (graphic user interface). 
Let us identify the Legal Grounds for these conclusions. The main LG 
may be found in the Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 and formalized in 
the following way: 
LG1: [form of expression of a program] (x) ⟹ [protected] (x). 
However, in the course of its argumentation, the Court also found 
that there is another LG present in the legal context of the case, based 
on Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29: 
LG2: [author’s intellectual creation] (x) ⟹ [protected] (x). 
On the basis of the decision it is also possible to identify the following 
rules which are not legal grounds: 
R1: [enables the reproduction of a program] (x) ⟹ [form of 
expression of a program] (x) (based on Article 10(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, although it should be noted that the formulation of the rule 
was a genuine construction of CJEU). 
R2: [its components permit the author to express his creativity] (x) 
⟹ [author’s intellectual creation] (x) (based on the opinion of the 
Advocate General).  
Due to the elements types involved in our initial set we will have only 
Rule-Based Constraints here (except for an inconsistency negative 
The Quest for Coherence in Judicial Reasoning.  
Two Approaches for Representing Cases in Constraint Satisfaction Framework 
 
i-lex, Novembre 2012, numero 17 182 
constraint between LC and LC'). Let us identify Basic Rule Based 
Constraints first: 
BRBC(1)0: <LG1, LC>; BRBC(2) 0:<LG2, LC>. 
The quality of these constraints as such is neutral, because it is 
doubtful whether graphic user interface is a form of expression of a 
program (see antecedent of LG1) or author’s intellectual creation (see 
antecedent of LG2). The case is undecidable on the basis of these 
constraints only. In order to gain decidability of the case it is necessary 
to introduce Chaining Rule Based Constraints, based on R1 and R2 as 
formulated above: 
CRBC(1)+: < R1, LG1>; CRBC(2)+: <R2, LG2>. 
Due to the properties of CRBCs summarized in Fact 1 and Fact 2 we 
have to agree that the quality of BRBCs mentioned above changes into 
negative one: 
BRBC(1)-: <LG1, LC>; BRBC(2) -:<LG2, LC>. 
and that the following constraints hold: 
BRBC(1)+: <LG1, LC'>; BRBC(1)+: <LG1, LC'>. 
Hence, we obtain the following constraint network for the Graphic 
User Interface case, where solid  lines represent positive constraints and 
dotted lines represent negative constraints. 
 
Fig.1: A constraint network for Graphic User Interface case. 
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R1 
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From this network it is obvious that graphic user interface is not 
protected by copyright, because the LC representing the proposition that 
it is protected is not supported by any of the elements. Therefore, the 
computation of coherence is straightforward. Let us emphasize that is 
our top-down representation enables us to state that (1) only six 
elements are relevant for the choice of the case’s conclusion and that 
(2) the decisive elements (R1 and R2) are not firmly grounded in any 
authoritative texts, but they are results of somewhat creative 
argumentation performed by the CJEU. 
 
5. Representation of the Case According to Bottom-Up Technique 
This section presents an alternative approach to judicial decision 
modeling within the framework of coherence as constraint satisfaction – 
the bottom-up approach. It differs from the top-down approach quite 
considerably which we demonstrate by creating a parallel model of the 
same judgment the model of which has been presented in the preceding 
section. The basic outline of the modeling is very similar and consists of 
two completely separate phases: (1) identification of admissible elements 
which become members of the set E and (2) modeling of constraints 
(symmetric relations that are members of sets C- and C+) between these 
elements. 
Def. 1. Admissible Element. Admissible element en('xn') is a 
function with x being any string of consecutive letters (the string may 
also contain numbers and any other symbols which shall further be 
referred to altogether as letters) extracted from the text of the judicial 
decision and n a natural number denoting a position of the string within 
the text of the judicial decision in relation to the other strings. 
Def. 2. Well-formed Admissible Element. Well-formed admissible 
element en('xn') is an admissible element that carries a specific meaning 
related to the decision. 
Def. 3. Complete Set of Admissible Elements. Complete set of all 
admissible elements D{e1('x1'), e2('x2'), …, en('xn')} is a set containing 
all the well-formed admissible elements that can be extracted from the 
judicial decision in such a way no individual letter is contained in more 
than one element. 
INTERMEZZO. It is possible to extract the well-formed elements in 
many different ways and thus, a large number of different sets D may 
be obtained. Therefore, it is always advisable to define a set R{r1, r2, …, 
r3} of rules specifying the method of the elements extraction to make 
the process of modeling more transparent. 
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Def. 4. Set of R-Excluded Admissible Elements. Set of R-
excluded admissible elements R is a set of elements which have been 
explicitly designated as being irrelevant with respect to the model. 
Def. 5. Set of R-Admitted Admissible Elements. Set of R-
admitted admissible elements E is a complement of the set R to form 
the set D. 
INTERMEZZO. Set of R-admitted admissible elements E is projected 
to the set E defined within the framework of coherence as constraint 
satisfaction. 
Let us use the above definitions to create the set E that is then 
employed as the input in the bottom-up modeling of the CJEU reasoning 
when giving the answer to the first question as is done in the preceding 
section. First of all, the set R is defined with regards to the fact that 
CJEU practices its own method of partitioning the decision into individual 
paragraphs - every single one of them presenting a rather independent 
piece of information. If the aim is to model the reasoning of the court - 
as exposed within the text of the decision itself - it seems rational to 
define the set R as follows: 
  R{ 1. Adhere to the partitioning provided by the court. 
2. Depart in situations in which the information carried by an 
individual element would be meaningless or too complicated. } 
It is not possible to include the resulting set D28 within this paper and 
thus it is only briefly commented on. By applying the r1 and r2 we have 
obtained the set D containing 163 elements en('xn'). Among these 72 
can be informally considered as aiming solely at organizing the 
information contained in the document – they can be informally referred 
to as structural elements (headings, paragraphs numbering). Additional 
11 elements can be considered as carrying meta-information, i.e. 
information describing the document itself. Very similarly to those, 24 
elements contain the citations of relevant international, EU and national 
legislation. These elements should indeed be part of the constraint 
satisfaction network modeling the reasoning of the court. However, 
every time any of the mentioned provisions is recalled the court 
explicitly restates it. The same applies mutatis mutandis to the 3 
elements constituting the ruling of the court. Furthermore, there are 11 
elements that contain information related to the proceedings in front of 
the national courts and the reference for the preliminary ruling, 9 
elements describing the issue of the court's jurisdiction and 1 element 
dealing with costs of the proceedings. All the elements that have been 
already mentioned are irrelevant with respect to the model and thus 
                                           
28 It can be accessed at http://is.muni.cz/www/134449/27186886/. 
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members of the set of R-excluded admissible elements R. Remaining 32 
elements are directly related to the reasoning of the court in the 
substantive matters with respect to the questions referred for the 
preliminary ruling. However, 8 of them belong to the second question 
which is for the sake of brevity not being part of the model and are 
members of the set R. Following the def. 5. we are left with the 
following E set of R-admitted admissible elements (with 'x' substituted 
for its short description): 
E{e94(is GUI a form of computer program within the meaning of the 
directive?), e96(non-existence of computer program explicit 
definition), e98(notion of computer program has to be explicated), 
e100(any form of a computer program protected by copyright), 
e102(term 'computer program' includes programs in any form), 
e104(source code and object code belong to the mentioned forms), 
e106(source code and object code are protected by copyright), 
e108(object of the protection is expression allowing reproduction), 
e110(preparatory materials belong to the mentioned forms), 
e112(object of the protection is expression allowing reproduction), 
e114(such form of expression must be protected that allows 
reproduction of the computer program itself), e116(definition of 
interfaces), e118(definition of GUI as an interaction interface between 
computer program and user), e120(GUI does not enable reproduction 
of the computer program), e122(GUI does not belong to the 
mentioned forms), e124(CJEU is entitled to rule beyond the question), 
e126(does graphic user interface enjoy general copyright protection?), 
e128(originality as necessary precondition for copyright protection), 
e130(graphic user interface can be protected if it is author's own 
intellectual creation), e132(decision on e130 is within the domain of 
national court), e134(guidance regarding performance of 132 by a 
national court), e136(guidance regarding performance of 132 by a 
national court), e138(guidance regarding performance of 132 by a 
national court), e140(GUI is not a form of computer program within 
the meaning of the directive but it enjoys general copyright 
protection)} 
Def. 6. 'Is Claimed to Be Ground for' relation. If an element 
ei('x i') is claimed explicitly by a court – or it is  apparent from the text 
of the decision - to be ground for an element ek('xk') then GF relation 
<ei('x i'), ek('xk')> exists.  
Def. 7. 'Is Claimed to Be Ground against' relation. If an element 
ei('x i') is claimed explicitly by a court – or it is apparent from the text of 
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the decision - to be ground against an element ek('xk') then GA relation 
<ei('x i'), ek('xk')> exists.  
Def. 8. 'Both Claimed to Be Ground for or against' relation. If 
an element ei('x i') together with an element ej('xj') are claimed 
explicitly by a court – or it is apparent from the text of the decision - to 
be both at the same time grounds for or at the same time grounds 
against an element ek('xk') then GT relation <e i('x i'), ej('xj')> exists.  
Def. 9. 'Provides Definition for a Term Used in' relation. If 
ei('x i') contains a definition or explanation of a term used in ek('xk') DEF 
relation <ei('x i'), ek('xk')> exists. 
Def. 10. 'Answers' relation. If ej('xj') contains a question and 
ek('xk') contains an answer to that question then relation A <e i('x i'), 
ek('xk')> exists. 
INTERMEZZO. GF, GT, DEF and A relations are projected to the set 
C+ and GA relation is projected to the set C- defined within the 
framework of coherence as constraint satisfaction. 
Following the above definitions we obtain from the set E29: 
C+{<e94, e96>, <e94, e100>, <e94, e102>, <e94, e122>, <e94, 
e124>, <e96, e98>, <e96, e100>, <e96, e102>, <e98, e106>, 
<e98, e108>, <e98, e110>, <e100, e102>, <e100, e104>, <e104, 
e106>, <e106, e108>, <e108, e110>, <e108, e112>, <e108, e114>, 
<e112, e114>, <e112, e122>, <e116, e118>, <e116, e120>, <e116, 
e122>, <e118, e120>, <e118, e122>, <e120, e122>, <e122, e130>, 
<e122, e140>, <e124, e126>, <e126, e130>, <e128, e130>, <e130, 
e132>, <e130, e140> <e132, e134>, <e132, e136>, <e132, e138>, 
<e134, e136>, <e134, e138>, <e136, e138>} 
C-{} 
The emerged model30 reveals several very interesting facts about the 
decision31. However, the most revealing of them is the key importance 
of the e112(object of the protection is expression allowing reproduction) 
element the whole decision is built around. However, the proposition 
carried by this element was heuristically manufactured by the CJEU 
observing the fact that all forms clearly considered to be within the 
meaning of the directive possessed certain property. Based on the 
assumption that GUI does not possess this property CJEU reached the 
                                           
29 Detailed description of the relations can be accessed at http://is.muni.cz/ 
www/134449/27186886/. 
30 Graphic representation of the model can be accessed at http://is.muni.cz/ 
www/134449/27186886/. 
31 Detailed analysis can be accessed at http://is.muni.cz/www/134449/ 
27186886/. 
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answer contained in e140(GUI is not a form of computer program within 
the meaning of the directive but it enjoys general copyright protection). 
 
Fig.2: A constraint network for Graphic User Interface case produced 
with the bottom-up approach. 
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6. Conclusions 
Both models suggest that the CJEU provides the interpretation of the 
term 'expressed in any form' without grounding it in the provisions of 
authoritative texts. This is somewhat disturbing considering the frequent 
citations of provisions of law. It either seems to be the case that there is 
a large portion of implicit reasoning both models fail to express or that 
the reasoning of the court is actually not grounded in authoritative text. 
If this is the case then the models can be used either as a natural 
starting point to improve the reasoning of the court or they can produce 
a competing reasoning leading to a different ruling. 
In the discussion above both techniques led to similar results, 
emphasizing the role of certain elements in the Court’s reasoning. This 
fact leads to a tentative conclusion that on the one hand the abstract 
features of the top-down model (the definitions of elements and 
constraints) are plausible and that in spite of the indicated deficiencies 
the reasoning of the CJEU is quite well structured and free of internal 
incoherencies. However, the apparent parallelism between the two 
approaches presented here ought to be verified by means of a larger 
base of legal decisions. 
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